



Direction, Time and Ether in the *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*:

A Critical Metaphysical Reappraisal

Sudipta Mondal

Ph.D. Research Scholar,
Department of Sanskrit,
Jadavpur University,
Kolkata, India.

Abstract: Raghunatha Siromani, widely recognized as one of the most brilliant thinkers of the Navya-Nyaya tradition, undertook a profound and independent re-evaluation of the padārthas — the fundamental categories of reality — in his celebrated treatise, *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*. This distinguished work holds a place of special importance among his philosophical writings and may rightly be regarded as a jewel within his intellectual corpus. It bears testimony not only to his exceptional analytical insight but also to his unwavering commitment to philosophical precision and rigor. The *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* rests firmly upon both scriptural testimony (pramāṇa) and logical reasoning (yukti). Raghunatha neither confines himself to inherited tradition nor relies solely upon abstract rational argumentation. Instead, he harmoniously combines these two sources of knowledge, thereby reinforcing the epistemological strength of his conclusions. His approach exemplifies a thoughtful equilibrium between deep respect for tradition and fearless critical inquiry. Although the treatise belongs broadly to the Nyaya-Vaisheshika philosophical lineage, it does not merely restate or defend its established doctrines. Rather, Raghunatha subjects the traditional categories to careful scrutiny, re-examining their definitions, scope, and ontological status. In certain instances, he proposes modifications and refinements that reveal his independent philosophical judgment. Significantly, he does not hesitate to incorporate certain categories acknowledged by the Mimamsa school, even when such acceptance diverges from conventional Nyaya-Vaisheshika

positions. This intellectual openness underscores his freedom from sectarian rigidity and his dedication to the pursuit of philosophical truth. Among the various topics explored in the *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, the concepts of Direction, Time and Ether occupy an important place. Raghunatha Siromani does not accept dik (direction) as an additional substance (dravya). According to him, dik is non-different from Īśvara. If Īśvara, delimited by a particular adjunct (upādhi) in the form of divided spatial distinctions, is accepted as the cause of the cognition of spatial remoteness (daiśika paratva) and proximity (aparatva), then the usage of terms such as ‘east,’ ‘west,’ ‘remoteness,’ and ‘proximity’ can be logically explained. Therefore, there is no need to admit dik as a substance distinct from Īśvara. Once the indivisible (akhaṇḍa), all-pervasive (vibhu), eternal (nitya) Paramēśvara is accepted as the cause of the world, it is unreasonable to posit another all-pervasive substance in the form of dik as something over and above Him. With regard to Time, Raghunatha offers a newer interpretation. According to the ancient doctrine, just as kāla is an all-pervasive (vibhu) substance, so too is Īśvara. Therefore, instead of admitting an independent Mahākāla through the relational term involved in the previously mentioned chain of relations (paramparā-sambandha), it is more appropriate to accept Īśvara Himself the vibhu substance — as the ultimate referent. Similarly, Raghunatha Siromani argues that there is no necessity to admit, over and above the eight substances such as earth, a distinct substance called ākāśa on the ground that it is the samavāyi cause of sound (śabda). Accordingly, the present study represents a sincere and sustained effort to examine, analyze, and elucidate the various dimensions, implications, and scope of the concepts of Direction, Time, and Ether as articulated in the *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*. By bringing together dispersed arguments and clarifying their philosophical significance, this work seeks to provide a coherent and critical understanding of Raghunatha’s metaphysical reflections within the larger context of Navya-Nyaya thought.

Keywords: Direction, *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, Time, Raghunatha, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, Ether.

Introduction

Raghunatha Siromani, the most distinguished and brilliant representative of the Navya-Nyaya school, undertook an independent and critical examination of the padārthas in his celebrated treatise, *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*. A careful study of this text reveals that, although numerous categories had been discussed and established by earlier philosophers in the foundational works of the Nyaya and Vaisheshika systems, Raghunatha, guided by a rational

and analytical spirit, accepted only those categories that he found to be logically tenable. Moreover, he critically rejected those traditional categories whose validity, in his judgment, rested more upon counter-arguments than upon sound and affirmative reasoning, even if they had long enjoyed authoritative status. In their place, he advanced his own independent conclusions. Thus, while the work formally belongs to the Nyaya-Vaisheshika tradition, it does not restrict itself to merely reiterating the conventional categories endorsed by that school. In certain instances, Raghunatha displayed remarkable intellectual openness by accepting categories recognized by the Mimamsa thinkers, even when such acceptance conflicted with established Nyaya-Vaisheshika doctrine. For this reason, the themes elaborated in the work may justly be regarded as a concrete expression of Siromani's independent philosophical vision. Raghunatha was a mature and self-assured thinker, fully confident in the strength of his intellectual insight. His innovative interpretations infused fresh vitality into the Navya-Nyaya tradition. Inspired by his example, many eminent logicians of the Navadvipa scholarly community continued to explore new lines of inquiry and articulate original arguments on diverse philosophical issues. In this light, *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* may rightly be considered the greatest and most influential among Siromani's works.

Objectives

Although Raghunatha Shiromani's *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* includes discussions on the concepts of Direction, Time and Ether, no comprehensive and systematic study devoted exclusively to these themes has yet been undertaken. The present work, therefore, constitutes a sincere attempt to critically examine and elucidate the various issues and dimensions of these concepts as articulated in the *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*.

Methodology

This research paper applies both analytical and descriptive methodologies. It is based on *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, its two well-known commentaries by Sri Vishwanath Nyayapanchanan Bhattacharya and Sri Raghudeva Nyayalankara, as well as other works in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The paper uses endnotes for additional references. The technical terms of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy are presented with diacritical marks where necessary. Book titles are presented in italics and diacritical marks are used where required.

Concept of Direction, Time and Ether in the *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*

In *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, Raghunatha Siromani states:

Dik-kālau neśvarādatiricyete, mānābhāvāt. Tat-tan-nimitta-viśeṣa-samavadhāna-vaśād
īśvarādeva tattatkāryaviśeṣāṇāmupapatteḥ. Pareṣāmekaikasmāddigāderiva vilakṣaṇā-
nām prācyādivyavahārāṇām iti. Śabdanimittakāraṇatvena klṛptasyeśvarasyaiva
śabdasaṁavāyikāraṇatvam. Śabdastajjanyastadaḍṛṣṭa-janyatvāt sukhādivaditi punara-
prayojakam. Adṛṣṭasya śabdajanakatve'pi tadāśrayasya janakatve mānābhāvāt.
Asmadādeśca śabdasaṁavāyikāraṇatve 'aham sukhādimānitivadaham śabdavāniti'
pratītyāpattiḥ. Śrotramapi ca kārṇa-śaṣkulīvivārāvachinna īśvara eva, yathā pareṣām
tathāvidhamākāśam.¹

God, delimited by one or another upādhi of time or by one or another upādhi of space. The 'particular effects' mentioned by Raghunatha are judgments such as 'this is older than that' and 'this is east of that' together with other cognitions grounded in temporal and spatial relations. In this context, he asserts that all such judgments originate from a single all-pervasive individual, which he identifies as God (īśvara). The reasoning proceeds in two phases: first, there is no adequate justification (no proof) for treating big-space as a substance different from big-time; second, there is no compulsion to accept big-space-time as an entity distinct from God. The distinction between 'big' time (Mahākāla) and 'little' time (Khaṇḍakāla) is important because this difference is crucial for understanding the first phase of the argument. The particular stretch of time that produces the judgment 'Z exists now' for example is a little-time; that is, it consists of big-time qualified by certain specific individuals such as the pot, the rays, and the mountain. A specific little-time may be distinguished from a specific little-space on the ground that the former gives rise to temporal judgments, whereas the latter generates spatial judgments; in other words, each is circumscribed by different individuals. Yet this distinction does not demonstrate that big-time and big-space are numerically distinct individuals, since a little-time could be a restricted aspect of the very same individual of which a little-space is also a restricted aspect. Thus, Raghunatha's initial step is to equate big-space with big-time, thereby reducing by one the total count of individuals in the cosmos. The author (Raghunath Siromani) encounters a more complex challenge: he attempts to argue that big-space-time is none other than God. According to Nyāya, God (īśvara) is a self (ātman) that differs from individual selves in certain respects. As already observed, He is all-pervasive (vibhu) and because He is coextensive with big-space-time, Raghunatha contends that spatial and temporal judgments may accordingly be understood in relation to Him. According to this line of thought, cognitions

concerning space and time are nothing but the effects produced when specific limiting conditions (upādhi) are superimposed upon the single, all-pervading individual, God. However, in advancing this further claim, Raghunatha seems to have reached a standpoint that even his own adherents were not prepared to accept. If God does not qualify as a substance, then the individual selves (ātman), which are substances, cannot be understood as merely delimited portions of Him. In any case, Raghunatha's suggestion is to equate what were once taken to be three numerically distinct individuals. From the sentence that follows, it may be inferred that he considers the principal challenge to this view to lie in the common intuition that judgments relating to space, time, and God constitute fundamentally different types of cognition. The renowned commentator Viswanatha Nyayapanchanana, in his commentary on *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, states:

Mānābhāvāditi. Prācyāṁ ghaṭaḥ, idānīm ghaṭa iti pratītinīyāmakasya vibhuna īśvarabhinnavatve mānābhāvādityarthaḥ. Vibhutvaṁ ca mūrtetaradvyatvam. Na ca dharmigrāhakamānameva īśvarabuddheḥ sādhaḥ syādata āha — tattannimitteti. prācyāṁ diśi dik kālē'smin kāla ityādeśca dikkālāmśe'nugatākāratayā digupādhes turyatattaddeśasaṁyogādeḥ kālopādheśca mihiraraśmivispandāderghaṭādaḥ sāksāt sambandhatayā tatsansargaghaṭake tayoruparatādyasamavāyikāraṇasaṁyogāśrayatayā vā tayor siddhirityādayaḥ prācāṁ pralāpāḥ.²

In other words, Raghunatha's contention is this: his opponents of the older school already acknowledge that the many diverse judgments concerning spatial direction — such as 'Pāṭna is east of Benares' and 'The lamp is above the floor'—are produced by a single substance qualified in different ways. Similarly, they accept that the various temporal judgments, which differs from one another, for example, 'Rama was born on Holi Festival, 1925' and 'The cat went to sleep five minutes before the rat' — are likewise grounded in one substance diversely delimited. If this is so, then they ought not to resist the further claim that all four of these judgments proceed from one all-pervasive individual. Raghunatha's emphasis is that both he and his opponents share, at minimum, the principle that a common substratum (āśraya), conditioned through its associations with other individuals, underlies such cognitions. This section thereby underscores that shared assumption. This portion of the discussion appears to function primarily as persuasive reinforcement, since the essential argument has already been set forth: the opponent lacks any proof (pramāṇa) that big-space, big-time, and God are numerically distinct, whereas Raghunatha's thesis is superior because it dispenses with two unnecessary individuals in the structure of the universe. Raghunatha's assimilation of space and time was not without precedent in the development of the system. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* does

not clearly demarcate space, time and a third entity ākāśa (ether), which will be considered shortly and this absence of sharp differentiation seems to have prompted at least one commentator in the tradition to attribute their identification to Kanada himself. Furthermore, the *Saptapadārthi* of Sivaditya explicitly declares that these three are in reality a single entity, distinguished only through their respective limiting conditions (upādhi). After collapsing three all-pervasive individuals into one, Raghunatha next maintains that a fourth all-pervasive entity, namely ether (ākāśa), should likewise be identified with God. The traditional line of reasoning offered in support of positing a distinct individual called ‘ether’ proceeds as follows. There exists a certain trope apprehended by means of hearing, which is termed ‘sound’ (śabda). Since sound is classified as a trope, it must inhere in a substance (dravya), for every trope requires a substratum (āśraya). The question, then, is: in which substance does it reside? None of the other recognized kinds of substance is suitable. The physical elements — earth, air, fire, and water cannot serve as the substratum of sound, for several reasons, two of which may be noted. First, so long as a chair exists, one can feel it whenever one places one’s fingers appropriately; but this is not the case with the basis of sound. At times, however intently one listens, nothing is heard; yet we are not inclined to conclude that the material vehicle of sound has thereby ceased to exist. Second, in the perception of the sensible qualities associated with the physical elements — touch, smell, taste, and color the sense-organ, according to the Naiyāyikas, comes into contact with the particular object at the very location where that object exists. In the case of sound, however, this model does not apply: sound proceeds from the object that produces it to the ear. The only remaining candidate substances in which sound might inhere are the internal organ (manas) and the soul (ātman). The internal organ, however, is not equivalent to what we ordinarily call the ‘mind’ as the locus of consciousness. Rather, within Nyāya, it functions as the instrument that gathers the data supplied by the external sense-organs and conveys them to the soul, which alone is the true seat of consciousness. Since the internal organ does not apprehend any distinctive class of trope peculiar to itself, but merely transmits those apprehended by the other senses, it cannot serve as the substratum of sound. This leaves only one further possibility: the soul. The old school, however, advances several objections to the view that sound inheres in the soul. For example, the only other tropes said to reside in the soul are internal states such as pleasure, pain, and cognition; yet sound, being perceptible by many souls, cannot be regarded as an internal trope. Additional arguments are also offered, including one presented by Raghunatha later having thus ruled out all other substances as potential substrata of sound, the earlier tradition concluded that it was necessary to posit a ninth substance, namely ether. Raghunatha, however, challenges this resolution. For this reason,

Raghunatha advocates the complete rejection of ether, proposing that it be replaced by the already acknowledged individual, God. Although God is indeed categorized as a soul, the earlier difficulty namely, that the tropes belonging to a soul are purely internal does not arise in His case. Sound may be treated as an ‘internal’ trope of God; yet, given that God is all-pervasive, such a trope could still be available to every individual soul, since all individuals subsist in God. Raghunatha then notes that his opponent, like himself, accepts God as a universal necessary condition for the occurrence of sound. Building on this shared premise, he suggests that instead of positing ether as a distinct substance, God should be regarded as the inherence-cause, that is, the substratum, of sound. By doing so, one avoids multiplying entities and thus eliminates commitment to an additional individual. The reasoning here follows the standard Nyaya pattern. First, the thesis is announced: ‘sound is inherence-caused by the individual soul.’ Next comes the reason: ‘because its necessary condition is the merit and demerit of the individual soul.’ Finally, an illustrative example is supplied to support the universal relation presupposed in the inference. If fully articulated, this third component would run as follows: ‘Whatever has as its necessary condition the merit and demerit of the individual soul is inherence-caused by the individual soul as, for example, pleasure.’ This represents the concise operative form of the Nyaya syllogism. It is evident that the force of the inference depends upon the example. The opponent’s claim is that sound stands in exact parallel to pleasure: since both share the same necessary condition, namely, the merit and demerit of the individual soul sound must, like pleasure, inhere in the individual soul. In other words, because pleasure is inherence-caused by the individual soul, and sound is said to resemble pleasure in the relevant respect, sound too should be regarded as inherence-caused by the individual soul. Raghunatha replies that this line of argument fails to overturn his own position, and he proceeds to explain the grounds for its inadequacy. If Raghunatha had set out his reasoning in complete detail, his strategy would have been to supply a counter-instance to the opponent’s illustration of pleasure. His central claim is that the analogy advanced by the opponent lacks universal validity: it applies in certain situations but fails in others. One clear case of failure is the color-trope belonging to a particular book. That color may arise owing to the necessary condition of someone’s merit and demerit, yet it does not inhere in that person’s soul; rather, it resides in the book itself. Hence, from the mere fact that something has as its necessary condition the merit and demerit of an individual soul, it does not follow that it must inhere in that very soul. Still, the opponent might object: ‘Even if the analogy is not exceptionless, what reason do you have to maintain that it is inapplicable in the case of the individual soul but applicable in the case of God? Why should your account be considered preferable to mine?’ Raghunatha replies

that his opponent overlooks a fundamental aim of the system — namely, to furnish metaphysical correlates for the distinctions disclosed in experience. It would amount to a categorial error to assume that sound (*śabda*) relates to persons in the same manner that happiness does. Rather, sounds are related to bells in the way that joys are related to persons. Since space and time have already been identified with God (*Īśvara*), God Himself naturally presents as the most appropriate substratum. Once again, Raghunatha concludes by offering an encouraging reassurance to his opponent. Within the Nyaya-Vaisheshika framework, the organ of hearing occupies a distinctive position. It is described as simply a portion of the all-pervading ether (*ākāśa*), with sound waves entering directly into the auditory organ itself. This differs from the other sense-organs, which apprehend tropes (*guṇa*) whose substrata are distinct from the organs that perceive them. Raghunatha reassures his critics that he preserves this distinctive feature of the auditory process; his only modification is to replace the superfluous ether with God. Another renowned commentator, Raghudeva Nyayalankara, in his commentary on *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, states:

Tattreti. Prācīnamatābhyupetapadārtheṣu madhya ityārthaḥ. Dikkālāvityādi. Dikkālayoratorikratvaṁ yat prācīnaiḥ svīkṛtaṁ tanna yuktisiddhaṁ tayostadatorikratve mānābhāvādityārthaḥ. Na cātra dikṭtvaṁ pakṣatāvachchedakīkṛtyātorikratvābhāvasādhane siddhāsiddhibhyāṁ vyāghāta iti vācyam. Pūrvasyaṁ diśi ghaṭa iti pratītiṣayībhūtavibhūtvasyaiva dikṭtvarūpatvāt. Na ca kālatvaṁ pakṣatāvachchedakīkṛtyātorikratvābhāvasādhane taddoṣatādavasthyam iti vācyam.³

For example — Pāṭaliputra is farther from Baṅga-deśa than Prayāga. Again, compared to Prayāga, Pāṭaliputra is nearer to Baṅga-deśa. This distance or nearness itself is accepted as a particular *guṇa* called *daiśika paratva* or *aparatva*. The said (*daiśika*) *paratva* or *aparatva*, being a particular *guṇa*, is therefore a *bhāva-padārtha*. Before the origination of any *bhāva-padārtha*, *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*, and *nimitta-kāraṇa* are required. Therefore, with regard to the particular *mūrta* entity Prayāga, Prayāga itself is the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the *paratva-guṇa* existing in it. The particular *mūrta* *deśa* which is Prayāga — its *saṃyoga* — is the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*. Although the *deśa* that is the *pratiyogī* of that *saṃyoga* may be another *deśa*, still one *anuyogī*, that is, an *āśraya*, is necessary, because without two distinct *dravya*, *saṃyoga* cannot be produced. Therefore, the *dravya* which is the *āśraya* of that *saṃyoga* — which is the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of the *guṇa paratva* and *aparatva* is called *dik*. In the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*, by the *sūtra* ‘*ita idamiti yatastaddiśyaṁ liṅgam*’⁴ the usage of distance or nearness is declared to be the inferential mark (*liṅga*) of *dik*. For, if *dik* were not admitted, then, according to the reasoning previously shown, there would be no other means for the production of *paratva*

or aparatva in the form of distance or nearness. On the basis of all these arguments, the ancient schools such as the Vaisheshika accepted a distinct *viśeṣa-padārtha* named *dik*. Again, the determination of time, such as ‘*idānīm*’ and ‘*tadānīm*’ (now or then), takes place through particular *kriyā*, such as the motion of the sun, the moon, etc. A particular *sambandha* between those *kriyā* and particular *dravya* such as *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* etc., must certainly be admitted. For without such *sambandha*, *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* and similar *piṇḍa* could not be related to the vibration (*spandana*) of the sun, etc. Without *sambandha*, the usage of ‘*idānīm*’ and ‘*tadānīm*’ with regard to those objects would not be possible. That *sambandha* of the *kriyā* cannot be *samavāya*, because *kriyā* resides in that which possesses the *kriyā* by *samavāya-sambandha*. Nor is *saṃyoga*, or any other *sambandha* between the *kriyā* and *dravya* such as *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*, possible. Therefore, it is by resorting to the *paramparā-sambandha* in the form of ‘*svāśraya-tapana-saṃyogī-saṃyoga*’ that such usages as ‘*idānīm ghaṭaḥ*’ and ‘*tadānīm paṭaḥ*’ continue in practice. The *viśeṣa dravya* that is apprehended by the component ‘*svāśraya-saṃyogī*’ of that *paramparā-sambandha* is called *kāla*. Another proof regarding *kāla* is this: *jyeṣṭhatva* and *kaniṣṭhatva* are particular *guṇa* in the form of *kālika paratva* and *aparatva*. In usages such as ‘*Lakṣmaṇa* is younger than *Rāma*’ and ‘*Rāma* is elder than *Lakṣmaṇa*,’ the *paratva-guṇa* in the form of *jyeṣṭhatva* arising in *Rāma* and the *aparatva-guṇa* in the form of *kaniṣṭhatva* arising in *Lakṣmaṇa* have as their *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* the *saṃyoga* of *kāla* with *Rāma* and *Lakṣmaṇa*. As the *āśraya* of that *saṃyoga*, *kāla* is established as the uncommon *nimitta-kāraṇa* of the cognition of *paratva* and *aparatva*. With this intention, by the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* — ‘*aparasminnaparam yugapat ciraṃ kṣipramiti kālalingāni*’⁵ the cognitions of the *jyeṣṭhatva* of the elder and the *kaniṣṭhatva* of the younger, as well as cognitions such as simultaneous (*yugapat*), quick (*kṣipra*), and delayed (*cira*), are declared to be inferential marks (*liṅga*) of *kāla*. If *kāla* were to be defined merely as the aggregate of the *kriyā* of the sun, moon, etc., then the scriptural statements that *kāla* is beginningless (*anādi*) and endless (*ananta*) would be contradicted. Thus, the ancient Vaisheshika and Nyaya schools accepted *dik* and *kāla* as *padārtha* additional to the eight *dravya* such as *pṛthivī*, *jala*, etc. Raghunatha Siromani refuted this ancient view. In refuting the doctrine, Raghunatha states that *dik* and *kāla* are not additional *padārtha*. If *dik* and *kāla* are not additional *padārtha*, then within which *padārtha* are they to be included? In resolving this question, Raghunatha says that *dik* and *kāla* are of the very nature of *Īśvara*, not additional entities. Since there is no proof (*pramāṇa*) in support of the ancient view that *dik* and *kāla* are additional *padārtha*, that doctrine is not logically established. Now an objection may arise: the non-additionality of *dik* and *kāla* is not established by *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, because *dik* and *kāla* are *atīndriya*. If their non-additionality is to be established by means of *anumāna*-

pramāṇa, then the inference would have to proceed by taking dikktva and kālatva as the pakṣatāvachchedaka. But if such an inference is admitted, then, since dik and kāla would already be established (siddha) by virtue of the dharma in the form of dikktva and kālatva serving as the pakṣatāvachchedaka, the inference would be vitiated by siddhi and asiddhi. In reply to this objection, it must be said that dikktva and the indivisible dharma constituting the very nature of kāla are not the pakṣatāvachchedaka in that inference. Rather, in cognitions such as ‘pūrvasyām diśi ghaṭaḥ,’ the vibhutva which delimits the viśayatā of that cognition should be taken as the pakṣatāvachchedaka and by taking that as the basis, the absence of additionality in the dik-padārtha is to be inferred. Similarly, in cognitions such as ‘idānīm ghaṭaḥ,’ the vibhutva which delimits the viśayatā should be taken as such a dharma; and, by taking kāla as the pakṣa qualified by that dharma, the absence of additionality is to be established. Here, by vibhutva is to be understood dravyatva different from mūrta-dravya, not parama-mahat-parimāṇatva; for, in a later treatise, the parama-mahat-parimāṇatva of Īśvara has been refuted. Again, an objection may arise: if dik and kāla are not additional padārtha, then how can common cognitions such as ‘pūrvasyām diśi ghaṭaḥ’ and ‘idānīm ghaṭaḥ’ be possible? Such cognitions can arise only by resorting to dik and kāla. If it is admitted that such cognitions arise from Īśvara alone, then how can the distinctions among cognitions such as ‘pūrvasyām diśi ghaṭaḥ,’ ‘prācīyām diśi ghaṭaḥ,’ and ‘idānīm ghaṭaḥ,’ ‘tadānīm ghaṭaḥ,’ be accounted for? In reply, it must be said that the distinctions among cognitions such as ‘prācīyām diśi ghaṭaḥ,’ ‘idānīm ghaṭaḥ,’ and ‘tadānīm ghaṭaḥ’ can be explained from Īśvara as delimited by the respective kālopādhi and digupādhi. According to the ancient view that is, of those who accept dik and kāla as additional padārtha — since one undivided kāla and one undivided dik are admitted, cognitions such as ‘prācīyām diśi ghaṭaḥ’ and ‘idānīm ghaṭaḥ’ are carried on from dik and kāla as delimited by particular upādhi, namely khaṇḍa-dik and khaṇḍa-kāla. In the same way, according to the present view, those very cognitions can be accounted for from Īśvara as delimited by the respective upādhi. Bhāva-kārya necessarily requires a samavāyi-kāraṇa. Janma-dravya, janma-guṇa, or karma these alone are bhāva-kārya. When śabda is a janma-guṇa, it must certainly be a bhāva-kārya. The ancients, on the ground that it is the samavāyi-kāraṇa of śabda, accepted ākāśa a nitya vibhu-dravya distinct from the eight dravya such as pṛthivī, etc. Refuting this ancient view, which established ākāśa as a padārtha, Raghunatha Siromani states that, since Īśvara is the nimitta-kāraṇa of all kārya whatsoever, Īśvara must also be accepted as the nimitta-kāraṇa of śabda-rūpa-kārya. Therefore, that Parameśvara who is admitted as the nimitta-kāraṇa of śabda must also be admitted as its samavāyi-kāraṇa. Hence, for the purpose of admitting a samavāyi-kāraṇa of śabda, it is unnecessary to accept an

additional padārtha called ākāśa. At this point, an objection may arise: if the samavāyī-kāraṇatva of śabda is attributed to Īśvara, then, in the absence of vinigamanā, why should kāraṇatva not likewise be attributed to jīvātman? In reply, it must be said that, since the nimitta-kāraṇatva of Īśvara with respect to śabda-rūpa-kārya is admitted by both parties (ubhaya-vādi-siddha), the samavāyī-tva of śabda should be attributed to Īśvara alone. Therefore, because there is vinigamanā in the form of lāghava (economy), it is proper to attribute samavāyī-tva to Īśvara. Now it may be questioned: just as samavāyī-kāraṇatva has been hypothetically admitted in Īśvara, so too the samavāyī-kāraṇatva of śabda in jīvātman may be admitted as ubhaya-vādi-siddha. There is also an anumāna-pramāṇa supporting this position. Thus: since śabda is adrṣṭa-janma of the jīva, therefore śabda is jīva-janma, like sukha, duḥkha, etc. By means of such anvaya-drṣṭānta-mūlaka-anumāna-pramāṇa, the janakatva in the jīva, like the janakatva in Īśvara, would be established as ubhaya-vādi-siddha. Therefore, in the absence of vinigamanā, the samavāyī-kāraṇatva of śabda may be attributed to the jīva just as to Īśvara. To this, Raghunatha replies that, by taking śabda as the pakṣa, jīva-janmatva as the sādhyā, and adrṣṭa-janmatva as the hetu, a valid anumāna is not possible. Since there is no tarka capable of removing the suspicion of vyabhicāra opposed to that inference, the said inference cannot establish jīva-janmatva. At this point, another objection may arise. Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva varies according to the difference in the kāryatāvacchedaka-dharma and the regulating sambandha of kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva determined by that difference. Thus, with regard to Īśvara's nimitta-kāraṇatā in respect of mere janma-mātra, the kāryatāvacchedaka-dharma is janmatva, and the kāraṇatāvacchedaka-sambandha is sva-samaveta-jñāna-viśayatva. Accordingly, the kāraṇatā of Īśvara which is ubhaya-vādi-siddha is nimitta-kāraṇatā. But if the samavāyī-kāraṇatā of śabda is admitted in Īśvara, then that kāraṇatā would be delimited by tādātmya-sambandha, because samavāyī-kāraṇatva is defined as that kāraṇatva which is delimited by tādātmya-sambandha as determined by kāryatā delimited by samavāya-sambandha. Now it is seen that, just as samavāyī-tva and kāraṇatva would have to be attributed to jīvātman, so too in Īśvara both samavāyī-tva and kāraṇatva delimited by tādātmya-sambandha would have to be attributed. Therefore, there is no scope for lāghava in attributing the samavāyī-kāraṇatva of śabda to Īśvara. Consequently, in the absence of vinigamanā, why should the samavāyī-kāraṇatva of śabda not be attributed to jīvātman? In reply to this objection, Raghunatha Siromani says that if we (the jīvas) were the samavāyī-kāraṇa of śabda — that is, if the samavāyī-kāraṇatva of śabda were admitted in jīvātman then, just as there is laukika-mānasa-pratyakṣa of sukha, duḥkha, etc., residing in the jīva in the form 'ahaṃ sukhī,' 'ahaṃ duḥkhī,' so also, in the case of śabda, since the necessary conditions for such mānasa-pratyakṣa would be present (namely,

samavāya in that which is the āśraya of manas-saṃyoga with a vijātīya object), there would inevitably arise a laukika-mānasa-pratyakṣa of śabda in the form ‘śabdavān ahaṃ’ (‘I am possessed of sound’). Therefore, śabda cannot be admitted as a guṇa of jīvātman. Now a further question may arise: if a dravya in the form of ākāśa, additional to the eight dravya such as pṛthivī, is not admitted, then what is to be called the śravaṇendriya? It is known that the ākāśa delimited by the cavity of the kaṇṇa-śaṅkulī is itself the śravaṇendriya. Therefore, on account of the śravaṇendriya, there appears to be no alternative but to admit an additional padārtha called ākāśa. In reply, Raghunatha Siromani states that, according to the ancient view, if ākāśa, when delimited by a particular upādhi, can become the śravaṇendriya, then why cannot Īśvara, when delimited by a particular upādhi, become the śravaṇendriya? Therefore, just as Paramātman, when delimited by particular forms (vighraha-viśeṣa), is designated as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva, so likewise Parameśvara, when delimited by the particular upādhi in the form of the cavity of the kaṇṇa-śaṅkulī, is known as the śravaṇendriya — this is the navīna-siddhānta. Those ancients who admit an additional padārtha called ākāśa also establish the śravaṇendriyatva of ākāśa in precisely the same manner.

References

1. *Padarthatattvanirupana*, Ed. P.T.G.Y Sampathkumaracharyulu, Pg. No. – 1.
2. *Ibid*, Pg. No. – 11.
3. *Ibid*, Pg. No. – 17.
4. *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* – 2/2/10.
5. *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* – 2/2/6.

Select Bibliography

- Annambhaṭṭa. *Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ* (With *Dīpikā* Commentary). Ed. Niranjanswarup Brahmachari. Kolkata: Sanskrit Book Depot, 2013 (Rpt., 2005 1st Pub.).
- Bhaṭṭācārya, Śrīmohana & Dīneśacandra Bhaṭṭācārya. *Bhāratīya Darśana Koṣa*. Kolkata: Sanskrit College, 1958.
- Chatterji, Kshitish. *Technical Terms and Technique of Sanskrit Grammar*. Kolkata: Calcutta University Press, 1964.

- Dāsgupta, Surendranāth. *A History of Indian Philosophy*. Vol-I. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1988.
- Guha, Dinesh Chandra. *Navya Nyaya System of Logic* (Some Basic Theories & Techniques). Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1968.
- Jhalakīkaraḥ, Bhīmācāryaḥ. *Nyāyakośaḥ*. Poona: The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1928 (3rd ed.).
- Raghunatha Siromani. *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* (With the Commentaries Padārthatattvāvaloka of Śrī Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācāya & *Ṭīkā* of Śrīraghudeva Nyāyālaṅkāra). Ed. P.T.G.Y Sampathkumaracharyulu. Tirupati: Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, 2010.
- Ibid.* Ed. Madhusudan Bhattacharya Nyayacharya. Kolkata: Sanskrit College, 1976.
- Ibid.* Ed. Karl H. Potter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Śāṅkaramiśra. *Vaiśeṣikasūtrapaskāraḥ*. Ed. Narayan Mishra. Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1969.
- Tarkālaṅkāra, Jagadīśa. *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* (With *Kṛṣṇakāntī*, *Prabodhinī* Commentaries). Ed. Dhundhiraj Sastri. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1973.
- Udayana. *Ātmatattvaviveka* (With the Commentaries of *Nārāyaṇī*, *Dīdhiti* & *Bauddhādhikāra* Vivṛti). Ed. Dhundhiraj Sastri. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1940.
- Vallabhācārya. *Nyāyalīlāvatī* (With the Commentaries of Vardhamānopādhyāya's *Prakāśa*, Śāṅkara Miśra's *Kaṇṭhābharāṇa* and Bhagīratha Ṭhākura's *Vibṛti*). Ed. Harihara Shastri. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1991 (2nd ed.).
- Vidyabhusana, Satis Chandra. *A History of Indian Logic*. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1978.
- Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānan(a). *Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ*. Ed. C. Sankara Rama Sastry. Madras: Sri Balamanora Press, 1923.